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PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN TEXAS AND A
PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE PRIVITY
WITHIN THE IMPLIED WARRANTY
OF MERCHANTABILITY
by James L. Johnson
RODUCTS liability law in Texas currently offers three major theories of recovery to a plaintiff who suffers injury to person or property
caused by a defective product.' Negligence, strict liability in tort,
and breach of an implied warranty of merchantability are concurrently
available, such that a plaintiff may pursue all three theories in a single
lawsuit. 2 A plaintiff is often well advised to plead all three causes of action
since, though conceptually similar in many respects, each theory bases liability on different factual elements and the ultimate resolution of the factual issues by the finder of fact cannot be predicted prior to trial. Thus, an
injured party can improve his chances of prevailing at trial by pleading
and proving all three causes of action for a single injury.
Multiple theory products liability litigation, however, creates jury confusion as the jury charge is often unintelligible 3 and the standard of a defendant's responsibility often incomprehensible. 4 This confusion leads to
inconsistent results 5 in derogation of the rights of both plaintiffs and defendants. Several commentators have proposed forms of a uniform doctrine of products liability to promote a more efficient and just disposition
of products liability lawsuits. 6 This Comment discusses the present status
1. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 1 (1978).
2. TEX. R. Civ. P. 48.

3. Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30, 36
(1973).
4. 1 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
FINAL REPORT 37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].

5. Note, Products Liability in New York. Section 2-318 of the U. CC-The Amendment
Without a Cause, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 61, 64 (1981); see also Dickerson, Was Prosser's
Folly Also Traynor's?or Should the Judge's Monument Be Moved to a FirmerSite?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 481-83 (1974) (discussing doctrinal confusion in products liability).
6. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 2; FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 37; see also Keeton,
Products Liability-Inadequacyof Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 408 (1970) (arguing
that strict tort liability dispenses with the need for alternate theories of negligence and implied warranty); Shanker, A Reexamination of Prosser'sProducts Liability Crossword Game."
The Strict or Stricter Liability of Commercial Code Sales Warranty, 29 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 550, 551 (1979) (arguing that implied warranty makes strict liability unnecessary);
Note, supra note 5, at 103 (recommending that strict tort liability remain applicable and the
statutory implied warranty of merchantability be eliminated).
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of these three theories in Texas law and recommends changes in order to
simplify products litigation without sacrificing substantial rights of the
7
litigants.
I.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY CAUSES OF ACTION

A.

Negligence

As early as 1912 Texas courts recognized a cause of action in negligence
by an injured consumer against a remote manufacturer whose want of care
8
in the manufacture of a product rendered it dangerous to human health.
The absence of any requirement of privity of contract between the manufacturer and the injured consumer set this decision apart from prior Texas
law. 9 Four years later Judge Cardozo wrote the opinion in MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.,' 0 the landmark decision that established the duty a
manufacturer owed to an ultimate purchaser for injuries caused by a
product that is dangerous to life and limb because of negligent manufacture."

Texas courts have adopted the Restatement version of the Mac-

Pherson decision, which proposes a reasonable care standard for
evaluating a manufacturer's negligence.' 2 Although the courts impose the
legal duty of reasonable care on remote manufacturers, to recover on a
negligence theory an injured party must also prove that the manufacturer's
7. See Note, Torts-Products Liabilit--Strict Liability and Warranty in ProductsLiability.Action, 63 MARQ. L. REV. 678, 711 (1980).
8. Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1912) (citing Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852)), writ ref'd, 106 Tex. 612 (1913).
9. See Southern Oil Co. v. Church, 74 S.W. 797, 798 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, no writ)
(citing Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 Mees. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842)); see also
National Sav. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 203-04 (1880) (discussing Winterbottom v.
Wright, which established the privity requirement, and Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852), which created an exception to the privity requirement for products that are inherently dangerous).
10. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
11. 111 N.E. at 1053 (citing Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852)).
12. Gonzales v. Caterpiller Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Tex. 1978); Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. 1968). The Restatement states the rule generally adopted following MacPherson in section 395:
Negligent Manufacture of Chattel Dangerous Unless Carefully Made
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a
chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for
which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those whom he
should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for
Fhysical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose
or which it is supplied.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
A special application of section 395 is stated in section 398:
Chattel Made Under Dangerous Plan or Design
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others
whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable
use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the
adoption of a safe plan or design.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965); see also id. comment a (special application
of § 395).
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breach of the legal duty proximately caused the injury and that the injured
party is one to whom the duty is owed. 13 A negligence claim, therefore,
remains a viable cause of action against a remote manufacturer, 14 or even
a lessor, 15 even though this theory of recovery has been6 used less frequently since the development of forms of strict liability.'
B. Strict Liability in Tortfor Unreasonably Dangerous Products
Recognizing a strong public policy against the sale of food unfit for
human consumption, the Texas Supreme Court in 1942 decided Jacob E.
Decker & Sons v. Capps, 17 allowing a cause of action by an ultimate consumer against a nonnegligent manufacturer of contaminated food.' 8 The
court based its decision on a warranty implied by law rather than negligence or the usual implied contractual warranty.19 This new implied warranty sounded in tort in the nature of deceit, but did not require any
knowledge by the manufacturer of the food contamination. 20 This cause of
action did not displace a negligence claim that might arise from the same
facts, 2 1 but allowed an injured plaintiff an independent basis for recovery
22
without the difficult task of proving a manufacturer's negligence.
The Decker decision aligned Texas law with a growing number of other
jurisdictions that had adopted a form of strict liability for food sellers23 in
response to a national concern with the pervasiveness of adulterated and
unsafe foodstuffs. 24 While the courts generally agreed that retail food sellers assumed a special civil responsibility to the consuming public, 25 the
attempts to justify this responsibility yielded a wide variety of ingenious
legal rationales. 26 The implied warranty explanation chosen by the Texas
Supreme Court originated in thirteenth century England and appeared in
13. Herring v. Hathcock, 643 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ).
14. See Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Tex. 1978); Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Tex. 1977); Otis Elevator Co. v.
Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 328 (Tex. 1968); South Austin Drive-In Theater v. Thomison, 421
S.W.2d 933, 949 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, writ ref d n.r.e.); Starr v. Koppers Co., 398
S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. See Sims v. Southland Corp., 503 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
16. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 644 (4th ed. 1971).
17. 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
18. Id at 622, 164 S.W.2d at 834.
19. Id at 618-19, 164 S.W.2d at 832-33.
20. Id at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831; see also Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1126 (1960) (history of action for breach of
warranty); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 4024 and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 728-51 (1970) (history of strict tort liability developing from
implied warranty).
21. 139 Tex. at 620, 164 S.W.2d at 833.
22. Id at 621, 164 S.W.2d at 834.
23. See Prosser, supra note 20, at 1106-08 (listing case law in 14 jurisdictions that allow
a nonprivity consumer to recover for personal injuries caused by contaminated food).
24. Id at 1104-10.
25. R. DICKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 26 (1951).
26. Prosser, supra note 20, at 1124 & n.153.
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American decisions in the early nineteenth century. 27 Although these
early instances of implied warranty involved strict liability of a food seller
as did Decker, the implied warranty in those early cases originally extended only to the immediate purchaser. 28 Use of a warranty theory derived from contractual settings to justify strict tort liability to a consumer
invited confusion because courts had to decide whether tort or contract
29
concepts applied.
The Decker court considered the confusion experienced by the courts
and concluded that it was due to a failure to note the difference in the
usage of the term "warranty. '30 The court then contributed to the confusion by describing its new warranty as an "implied warranty imposed by
32
3
operation of law as a matter of public policy," ' a "warranty of purity,
an "implied warranty of wholesomeness, ' 33 and a "warranty of suitableness."134 The form of strict liability imprecisely described by the warranty
terminology generally remained restricted to foodstuffs for a quarter of a
35
century.
In 1967 the Texas Supreme Court, in the companion cases of McKisson
37
v. Sales Affiliates, Inc. 36 and Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks
extended strict tort liability to manufacturers of all products by adopting
section 402A of the Restatement (Second)of Torts.38 Section 402A imposes
liability on a manufacturer of a product that is sold in an unreasonably
27. Id at 1104.

28. Id
29. Id at 1124-34.
30.

139 Tex. at 617, 164 S.W.2d at 831.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 612, 164 S.W.2d at 829.
Id
Id at 616, 164 S.W.2d at 831.
Id. at 620, 164 S.W.2d at 833.

35. Sales & Perdue, The Law of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REV. 1, 4
(1976). Manufacturers of contaminated animal feed were also occasionally found liable for
breach of an implied warranty to a remote consumer. See McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow,
405 S.W.2d 123, 137-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref d n.r.e.); Burrus Feed Mills,
Inc. v. Reeder, 391 S.W.2d 121, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, no writ); International
Milling Co. v. Jernigan, 191 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1945, no writ); see also
Cudmore v. Richardson Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965,
writ refd n.r.e.) (manufacturer of drug for intimate bodily use liable for negligence). Federal district courts applying Texas law assumed that the Texas Supreme Court would extend
strict tort liability to manufacturers of products other than food. See Putman v. Erie City
Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911, 923 (5th Cir. 1964) (wheelchair collapse); Siegel v. Braniff Airways,
Inc., 204 F. Supp. 861, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (aircraft crash).
36. 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967).
37. 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. 1967).

38.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965). Under the topic entitled strict

liability, section 402A states:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
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dangerous condition if the defective condition causes injury to person or
property and the product reaches the consumer or user without substantial
change. 39 The court recognized that section 402A stated the law in Texas
as developed under the implied warranty in tort theory and acknowledged
the logic of applying the Decker rule to all defective products causing per40
sonal injury.
Subsequent strict liability opinions by the court did not mention the implied warranty in tort terminology, but described the cause of action as
simply strict liability in tort,4 ' a description that emphasizes the departure
from contractual warranty principles. 42 Settling the uncertain status of
Decker, the court in Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers 43 stated that
section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code" had replaced the
Decker implied warranty in tort as a means of establishing a manufac45
turer's liability in Texas.
After the introduction of section 402A the Texas courts began broadening the scope of strict liability. The supreme court confirmed the applicability of section 402A to damages for injury to a claimant's property, other
than the product itself, in O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. CA. Hoover &
Son. 46 The court later applied section 402A protection beyond consumers
or users by including bystanders.4 7 In extending liability beyond manufacturers, the court in Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder48 held
49
Courts of
that bottlers were sellers within the meaning of section 402A.

appeals' decisions further extended liability to retailers for injuries sustained by shoppers who had not yet purchased a product 50 and to a city in
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
39. Fort Worth Steel & Mach. Co. v. Norsworthy, 570 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1978, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
40. 416 S.W.2d at 789.
41. See Ford Motor Co. v. Darryl, 432 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1968); O.M. Franklin
Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover & Son, 418 S.W.2d 482, 482 (Tex. 1967).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
43. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
44. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
45. 557 S.W.2d at 78; accord Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d
320 (Tex. 1978).
46. 418 S.W.2d 482, 482 (Tex. 1967) (overruling Cruz v. Ansul Chem. Co., 399 S.W.2d
944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Brown v. Howard, 285
S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
47. See Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment o (1965) (reserving opinion on applicability of
strict tort liability in suits by bystanders).
48. 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969).
49. Id at 548; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549,
560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, no writ) (both manufacturer of car and
dealer who installed air conditioner held liable).
50. Shoppers World v. Villareal, 518 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (leaking bottle of soap); Davis v. Gibson Prods. Co., 505 S.W.2d 682,
688-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ refd n.r.e.) (hand cut by machete on dis-
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its role as a municipal corporation selling water.5 ' Restaurants 52 and sellers of used products 53 were also subject to liability. The supreme court
determined that introducing a product into commerce by lease rather than
court refused, however, to
by sale was sufficient to impose liability.5 4 The
55

impose strict liability for inadequate services.
In Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service, Inc. 56
the court limited the scope of section 402A somewhat by disallowing re57
covery when the plaintiff alleged only economic loss to the product itself.
The court thus followed strong dictum expressed in Nobility Homes of
Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 58 which involved economic loss to a product that
was not unreasonably dangerous. In the companion case of Signal Oil &

Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products59 the court stated that this economic loss
was recoverable if the claimant also suffered injury to his property other
60

than the product itself.
As the doctrine of strict tort liability developed in Texas, the courts refined the critical elements of "defective condition" and "unreasonably
dangerous," terms that were used synonymously, 6 1 until three distinct categories emerged. Design defects comprise the first type of product defect.
The supreme court defined a defectively designed product in Turner v.
play). But see Moore v. Weingarten, Inc., 523 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (no strict liability for slip and fall on grape on store floor since grape
not defective).
51. Moody v. City of Galveston, 524 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
52. Hebert v. Loveless, 474 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (restaurant escaped liability, however, due to insufficient evidence of ice contamination); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965) (rule applies
to manufacturer, wholesaler, retail dealer, or distributor, and operator of a restaurant).
53. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no

writ).
54. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975). Relying on Rourke, the Fifth
Circuit extended strict liability to a manufacturer of ammunition that followed government
designs with government-supplied materials on a cost-plus contract with the government.
Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds,
423 U.S. 3 (1975).
55. Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. 1968) (optometrist fitting nondefective
contact lenses); see also Erwin v. Guadalupe Valley Elec. Co-op, 505 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (electricity not defective); Shivers v. Good
Shepard Hosp., Inc., 427 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(contaminated anticoagulant administered by hospital).
56. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
57. Id. at 312-13. Economic loss includes direct economic loss, which is defined as ordinary loss of bargain. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIEconomic loss also encompasses
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 406 (2d ed. 1980).
consequential economic loss, which includes loss of business reputation. Id at 409.
58. 557 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex. 1977).
59. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
60. Id. at 325. But see Keeton, supra note 1, at 7-9 (criticizing recovery of economic loss
in strict tort liability lawsuit).
61. Blackwell Burner Co. v. Cerda, 644 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex. App.-San Antonio

1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A comment i (1965)

(liability should be imposed only when the defective condition makes the product unreasonably dangerous).
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General Motors Corp.62 as a product unreasonably dangerous as designed
when the utility of the product is weighed against the risk associated with
its use.63 The court expressly substituted this definition of design defect for
a previous definition that used an ordinary consumer's expectation or a
prudent manufacturer standard. 64 The defect need only be a producing
cause 65 of the injury, not a proximate cause. 6 6 Thus the danger need not
at the time of manufacture if
be reasonably foreseeable or even knowable
67
the danger is demonstrable at trial.
When a manufacturing defect, the second type of defect, is at issue the
applicable test for defining defectiveness seems to be the ordinary consumer test.68 Under this test a product is defective if it exposes its user to
an unreasonable risk of harm and is dangerous to a greater degree than an
ordinary user would contemplate. 69 At least one court of appeals has held,
however, that the risk versus utility test used in design defect cases applies
as well in manufacturing defect cases. 70 Manufacturing defect cases also
resemble design defect cases in that a producing cause, rather than a proxi7
mate cause, is required. '
Marketing defects in the form of inadequate warnings or instructions are
62. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
63. Id. at 847; see also 3 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.02 (1982) (drawing
instruction directly from Turner). But see Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect.From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 64349 (1980). Birnbaum notes that strict liability seems to apply fairly and efficiently in manufacturing defect cases, but is very critical of its use instead of a negligence standard in design
defect cases. Id at 645. The risk-utility test for an unreasonably dangerous product in a
design defect case is merely a detailed version of a negligence calculus. Id. at 649. Unlike
the negligence standard, however, the risk-utility test does not distinguish between vigilant,
safety-conscious manufacturers and lax, careless manufacturers. Id at 645. Thus the riskutility test might provide less incentive to manufacturers to design safer products than a
negligence standard would. Id
64. 584 S.W.2d at 847; see also General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 347
n.1 (Tex. 1977) (product would not meet reasonable expectations of ordinary consumer).
65. The definition of producing cause is: "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause,
which, in a natural sequence, produced the occurrence. There can be more than one producing cause." 3 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 70.01 (1982).
66. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977). The definition
of proximate cause given to a jury may provide:
'PROXIMATE CAUSE' means that cause which, in a natural and continuous
sequence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not
have occurred; and in order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission complained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have foreseen
that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result therefrom.
There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.
1 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 2.02 (1969).
67. General Motors v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351 (Tex. 1977).
68. See 3 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.01 & comment at 216 (1982); see also
Special Project, Texas Tort Law in Transition, 57 TEX. L. REV. 381, 470-71 (1979) (tracing
case law development of consumer expectation test).
69. Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1980); V.
Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1978,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g, i (1965).
70. See Thiele v. Chick, 631 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
71. C.A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596, 596 (Tex. 1969).
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the third type of defect within strict tort liability. 72 Unlike the other defect
types, an element of foreseeability of danger is present in determining
when a manufacturer is under a duty to warn. 73 The Texas Supreme
Court in Technical Chemical Co. v. Jacobs74 defined a product as unreasonably dangerous when an ordinary manufacturer would not have marketed the product without warning of the dangers involved in using the
product and providing instructions on how to avoid those dangers. 75 Only
those dangers that are reasonably foreseeable at the time of marketing the
product are within the duty to warn. 76 Once a risk is found to be foreseeable, however, liability will depend on a finding of producing cause, rather
than involve another foreseeability issue within proximate.causation. 77 To
be adequate, warnings or instructions must be given with sufficient intensity to cause a reasonable user to take precautions in proportion to the
79
danger7 8 and must be reasonably calculated to reach the ultimate user.
C. Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability
On July 1, 1966, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) first became
effective in Texas. 80 The following year the UCC was reenacted within the
Texas Business and Commerce Code, becoming effective on September 1,
1967.81 Section 2.31482 provides a statutory cause of action for breach of
72. See generally Sales, The Duty to Warn & Instructfor Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability,

13

L.J. 521 (1982) (discussion of marketing defects).
73. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Technical
Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1972); Lopez v. Aro Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333,
335 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
74. 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
75. Id. at 605.
76. Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. 1974); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v. Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.); Olivarez v.
Broadway Hardware, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 195, 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, writ
ref d n.r.e.); Ford Motor Co. v. Russell & Smith Ford Co., 474 S.W.2d 549, 557-58 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ); Flanery v. Terry Farris Stores, Inc., 438 S.W.2d
864, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ); Muncy v. Magnolia Chem. Co.,
437 S.W.2d 15, 17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
77. Blackwell Burner Co. v. Cerda, 644 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (pear burner found to be defective for lack of warning about danger
from foreseeable misuse, but defect held not a producing cause of plaintiffs injury since he
was already aware of danger).
78. Id. at 514-15; Lopez v. Aro Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333, 335-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518
S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. Shop Rite Foods, Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 619 S.W.2d 574, 578 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
80. Acts 1965, ch. 721, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (Vol. 2).
81. Acts 1967, ch. 785, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 2343.
82. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The implied
warranty of merchantability is set forth as follows:
(a) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2.316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
ST. MARY'S

(b) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
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an implied warranty of merchantability, which has been termed the most
important warranty in the UCC.83 The law implies the warranty of
merchantability in the sale of goods by a merchant who regularly deals in
goods of that kind and obligates those sellers to provide goods fit to be
used for their ordinary purposes. 84 Merchantability, however, is measured
against a trade or industry standard,8 5 which, along with the requirement
that recoverable damages be proximately caused by the breach, 86 gives the
implied warranty of merchantability a negligence flavor.8 7 Despite these
similarities to a negligence cause of action, an implied warranty of
merchantability action is considered a form of strict liability. 88
The Texas Legislature expressly left to the courts the question of a privity requirement for application of the implied warranty. 89 The legislature
thus took a neutral position on the privity question, 90 although the proposed UCC would have extended warranty protection for personal injury
to any natural person in the family or household of a buyer. 9 1 Manufacturers had expressed concern about the proposed extension of warranty protection to some nonprivity plaintiffs, which created a potential impediment
to adoption of the UCC.92 The legislature recognized, however, that en(1) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(2) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(3) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(4) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement of even kind,
quality and quantity involved; and
(5) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(6) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
Id
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 57, at 343.
84. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
83.

85. See general, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 57, §§ 9-7 (discussing definition
of merchantability).
86. Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 328 (Tex. 1978); TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.715(b)(2), 2.314 comment 13, 2.715 comment 5 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968); 3 TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES PJC 71.01 (1982).
87. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 57, at 343.
88. Id.
89. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 2.318
states:
This chapter does not provide whether anyone other than a buyer may take
advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to the buyer or
whether the buyer or anyone entitled to take advantage of a warranty made to
the buyer may sue a third party other than the immediate seller for deficiencies in the quality of the goods. These matters are left to the courts for their
determination.
Id.
90. M. Ruud, Legislative History of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code Bill (1965)
(letter from Millard H. Ruud to State Senator Tom Creighton, March 18, 1965).
91. TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ANALYSES OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: SALES 105 (1953) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL].
92. M. Ruud, supra note 90. See generally Ruud, The Texas Legislative History of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 44 TEX. L. REV. 597, 597-600 (1966) (describing the 15-year
legislative effort to enact the UCC).
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actment of the UCC without the nonprivity extension would leave unaffected a nonprivity plaintiffs common law rights under the Decker implied
warranty in tort. 93 The UCC implied warranty of merchantability, therefore, merely clarified the law developed by Texas courts, which had imposed an implied warranty of merchantability
only when a buyer and a
94
seller were in privity of contract.
Due to the expressed neutrality of the enacted UCC, the Texas courts of
appeals disagreed on the privity question. 95 The supreme court addressed
the issue in Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers 96 and held that a
buyer need not be in privity with a remote seller to recover for economic
loss under the implied warranty of merchantability. 97 The court recognized that economic losses should be remedied under contract law and
personal injuries should be remedied under tort law. 98 The UCC, however, expressly allows consequential damages for personal injuries caused
by a breach of warranty. 99 Accordingly, in Garcia v. Texas Instruments,
Inc.,1oo the supreme court allowed a recovery for personal injuries under
the implied warranty.10' The Garcia court extended the Nobility decision
to nonpurchasers, eliminating any requirement of privity in an implied
02
warranty claim.
Implied warranty protection is not unlimited in scope, however. When
a buyer knows that he is buying a used product, a number of courts have
held that an implied warranty of merchantability does not accompany the
93. M. Ruud, supra note 90.
94. See Brantley v. Thomas, 22 Tex. 271, 271 (1858); McKinney v. Fort, 10 Tex. 220,
232 (1853); Aeronautical Corp. v. Gossett, 117 S.W.2d 893, 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1938, no writ); S.H. Kress & Co. v. Ferguson, 60 S.W.2d 817, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1933, writ refd); Keeling v. Collins Grain Co., 59 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1933, no writ); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Offenhauser, 42 S.W.2d 859, 859 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931, writ refd); Seale v. Schultz, 3 S.W.2d 563, 563 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1927, writ dism'd); Norvell-Wilder Hardware Co. v. McCamey, 290 S.W. 772,
773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1926, writ dism'd); Seby v. Craven Lumber Co., 259 S.W.
1093, 1094-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1924, no writ); Fulwiler Elec. Co. v. Jinks McGee &
Co., 211 S.W. 480, 481 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1919, no writ); A. S. Cameron Steam Pump
Works v. Lubbock Light & Ice Co., 167 S.W. 256, 260 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1914, no
writ); El Paso & S. R.R. v. Eichel & Weikel, 130 S.W. 922, 936 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ
refd); Houk v. Berg, 105 S.W. 1176, 1177 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907, no writ); Houston Cotton
Oil Co. v. Trammell, 72 S.W. 244, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.), rev'don other grounds, 96 Tex. 598,
74 S.W. 899 (Tex. 1903); Fay Fruit Co. v. Talerico, 63 S.W. 656, 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901,
no writ).
95. Compare Foremost Mobile Home Mfg. Corp. v. Steele, 506 S.W.2d 646, 648-49
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ) (requiring privity), and Thermal Supply of
Texas, Inc. v. Asel, 468 S.W.3d 927, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971, no writ) (requiring
privity), with Ford Motor Co. v. Lemieux Lumber Co., 418 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1967, no writ) (no privity required).
96. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
97. Id at 81.
98. Id. at 82; see Comment, The Vexing Problem of Purely Economic Loss in Products
Liability.- An Injury in Search of a Remedy, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145, 175 (1972).
99. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
100. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
101. ld at 465.
102. Id.

COMMENTS

1984]

product. 10 3 The implied warranty has not been applied to rental agreements or service contracts since article 2 of the UCC applies only to
sales. 104
II.
A.

DEFENSES

Plaintiff's Conduct

Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence in Texas, 10 5 a plaintiffs
contributory negligence absolutely barred his recovery in an action against
a negligent defendant. 10 6 Article 2212a, 10 7 the Texas comparative negligence statute, allows a plaintiff to recover in an action unless his negligence is a greater proximate cause of his injury than the combined
negligence of all parties whom he has sued.108 Thus, a plaintiff cannot
recover that part of his damages attributable to his own negligence. 0 9 The
assumption of the risk defense, which completely defeated the cause of
action of a plaintiff who voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a
known danger," 10 remained a viable defense in negligence actions until the
Texas Supreme Court abolished it in Farley v. M M Cattle Co. "'
Assumption of the risk nevertheless remained a defense in strict tort liability actions. 12 The contributory negligence of a plaintiff in failing to
discover a product defect or guard against the possibility of a defect was
103. Valley Datsun v. Martinez, 578 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, no writ) (used car); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1975, no writ) (used bricks); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d
877, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (used tractor); see also Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246, 250 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (no implied warranty
exists under Texas law for used goods); cf. Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1979) (court suggested implied warranty might
exist, but did not address the question since contract language was sufficient to waive any

warranty that may have arisen).
104. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.106, .314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); G-W-L,

Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1982) (using "essence of transaction" test,
contract primarily for services not within UCC); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580
S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.) (no warranty implied in
equipment lease); OJ&C Co. v. General Hosp. Leasing, Inc., 578 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, no writ) (no warranty implied in computer lease); Freeman v. Shannon, 560 S.W.2d 732, 738-39 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.)
(no warranty implied in contract essentially for services); see also 3 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:6 (3d ed. 1983) (implied warranty of merchantability does not
apply in nonsale transaction).
105. See Act of Apr. 9, 1973, ch. 28, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 41, 43.
106. Parrott v. Garcia, 436 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. 1969); Burkes v. Koppers Co., 567
S.W.2d 540, 540-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ) (accident occurred before adoption of comparative negligence, though case decided after adoption); Head v. Coleman, 470
S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).
107. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984) (effective Sept. 1, 1973).
108. Id. § 1.
109. Id.
110. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 1974); Ruiz v. Flexonics, 517
S.W.2d 853, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.); Helicoid Gage Co.
v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ refd n.r.e.);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
111. 529 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Tex. 1975).
112. Rourkes v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975). Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d
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not, however, a defense. 1 3 When the supreme court first adopted section
402A, 14 the court cited authority to support the proposition that a plaintiff's conduct could be categorized as either a failure to discover and guard
against the defect or as a voluntary and unreasonable encounter with a
known danger. 15 This proposition failed entirely to recognize that a
plaintiffs negligent conduct could at times be the major cause of his injury
and an undiscovered defect could only incidentally increase the severity of
that injury.
Texas courts fashioned an awkward "unforeseeable misuse" defense to
address the cases in which the plaintiff is not aware of the product risk. 16
This defense depended on a defendant's showing that a plaintiffs use of
the product was not reasonably foreseeable and that the plaintiff should
l
have reasonably anticipated the harm that resulted from the misuse.' '
Unlike assumption of the risk, misuse was administered as a comparative
defense when a product defect was also a contributing cause of a claimant's injury." 8 Instead of following the lead of the comparative negligence
statute' 19 that denied recovery to a plaintiff whose conduct contributed
more to his injury than did the product defect, however, the supreme court
in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Hopkins 120 created a "pure" comparative causation system. 2 1 Hopkins allowed a plaintiff to recover that portion of his
damages caused in fact by the product defect, even though misuse proximately caused a greater percentage of the damages. 122 The assumed risk
and misuse defenses received much criticism, 123 but remained in use while
the court's attention turned to adopting comparative apportionment in implied warranty actions.
916, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 402A comment n (1965).
113. McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. 1967); Shamrock Fuel
& Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 782-84 (Tex. 1967); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
115. Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1967) (citing
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 665 (3d ed. 1964) and Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 21-22 (1965)).
116. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977); Rourke v.
Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 799 (Tex. 1975); Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 856
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916,
923 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref d n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment h (1965); see also Pope & Lowerre, The State of the Special Verdict-1979,
11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 47 (1979) (misuse defense is awkward).
117. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 351-52 (Tex. 1977).
118. Id. at 352.
119. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a (Vernon Supp. 1984).
120. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
121. Id at 352.
122. Id
123. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 750-51 (Tex. 1980) (Pope, J.,
concurring); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Preludeto
ComparativeFault, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 729, 776-78 (1980); Special Project, supra note 68,
at 486-87.
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In Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products 24 the Texas Supreme
Court established a contributory negligence defense to a breach of implied
warranty of merchantability claim.125 Prior to Signal only a plaintiff who
had discovered a product defect or who reasonably should have discovered
the defect was barred from recovery, since such discovery broke the chain
of proximate causation from the seller. 126 As in Hopkins, the court in Signal did not feel constrained by the legislature's expressed policy to allow a
plaintiff in a negligence action to recover only when his negligence was not
more than the defendants' negligence. 127 Consequently, a plaintiff in an
implied warranty action could recover that portion of his damages proximately caused by the product defect regardless of the extent to which his
own negligence was a concurring proximate cause. 28
The inherent confusion of litigating the four defenses of misuse, assumed risk, modified comparative negligence, and pure comparative negligence in a single defective product lawsuit prompted the supreme court to
abolish the misuse and assumed risk defenses in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co. 129 For strict tort liability cases the court adopted a scheme of pure
comparative causation to apportion damages when a plaintiffs negligence
has contributed to his injury.' 30 Thus, a plaintiffs misconduct as a proximate cause of his injury will reduce his recovery whether he brings an
action in3 negligence, implied warranty of merchantability, or strict liability
in tort.1 '

When the product defect is due either to breach of implied warranty, to
the unreasonably dangerous nature of the product, or to negligence, the
finder of fact will compare the harm caused by the defective product or
negligence of each defendant with the negligence of the plaintiff. 132 The
percentages of the plaintiff's injury caused by each party will total 100%,
but a plaintiffs recovery will, in all cases, be reduced in proportion to the
percentage of his injuries caused by his own negligence. 133 Unlike cases
involving only negligence, a plaintiff whose own negligence caused more
than fifty percent of his injury may still recover the remainder of his damages so long as at least one of the defendants is found partially liable on a
theory other than negligence.1 34 In addition, a defendant who is liable for
any part of a plaintiffs injury will be jointly and severally liable for the
entire part of the plaintiffs injury caused by all the defendants, if one of
35
the defendants is liable on a theory other than negligence.'
124. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
125. Id at 329.

126.
5 (Tex.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 327-28; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.314 comment 13, 2.715 comment
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
572 S.W.2d at 329; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
572 S.W.2d at 329.
665 S.W.2d 414, 428 (Tex. 1984).
Id at 427-28.
Id at 429.
Id at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id
Id.
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Disclaimers of Liability

A party may agree to exempt a seller from liability for future negligence
unless such exemption is contrary to public policy. 136 Such a disclaimer is
void between parties who have substantially unequal bargaining power,
even if they are in privity. 137 As a result, a disclaimer of liability for negligence may be unenforceable against a nonprivity buyer or user uninvolved
in the bargain. In a strict tort liability action, moreover, the drafters of
section 402A intended to immunize strict liability from the effects of all
38
contractual disclaimers, even between a seller and an immediate buyer.'
The Texas Supreme Court in Mid ContinentAircraft Corp. v. Curry County
Spraying Service, Inc. ,'139 intimated, nevertheless, that the intent of the
parties to a contract to allocate risk through a disclaimer should not be
nullified by applying strict liability in frustration of the contract.' 40 This
rationale, however, has little application to a typical consumer purchase in
which the parties have not bargained for a reallocation of risk. The court
of appeals decision in McMillen Feeds, Inc. v. Harlow 4 ' denied any effect
to a contractual disclaimer in a strict liability case under the old implied
warranty in tort theory. 142 This approach would therefore seem applicable
to current strict tort liability cases brought by a consumer under section
402A.
The UCC expressly allows exclusion of the implied warranty of
merchantability, provided that the exclusion is worded in terms of
merchantability or an "as is" sale and a written exclusion is conspicuous. 14 3 A court is likely to hold a disclaimer of liability for personal injury
caused by a defect in consumer goods to be unconscionable and unenforceable, however.1'" The supreme court made clear in Mid Continent
that an "as is" disclaimer is enforceable against the immediate commercial
buyer when the buyer suffered only economic loss."45 The effect between
136. Allright, Inc. v. Elledge, 515 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. 1974); Crowell v. Housing Auth.,
495 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. 1973). The court, however, will strictly construe provisions purporting to exempt a person from the exercise of ordinary care. Langford v. Nevin, 117 Tex.
130, 133, 298 S.W. 536, 537 (1927).
137. Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. 1973) (low-income tenant
recovering for wrongful death from public housing authority).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
139. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
140. Id at 312.
141. 405 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
142. Id at 137-38. Under the old warranty theory the defendant was liable for food
contamination even though it was not negligent. Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
143. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.316, .719 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); W.R.
Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ); Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.719(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (limitation of
remedy for personal injury prima facie unconscionable).
145. 572 S.W.2d at 313. The court did not address the issue of whether the used nature
of the defective aircraft would prevent imposition of an implied warranty of
merchantability. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. The court also did not address
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commercial parties of disclaimers of liability for property damage and personal injury otherwise recoverable under section 402A remains undetermined, but at least property damage disclaimers are enforceable under the
Mid Continent rationale. 146 In cases of nonprivity buyers a disclaimer that
147
is never brought to the attention of the buyer may be unenforceable,
though clearly a buyer may not recover for breach of implied warranty
from a remote manufacturer if148
an intermediate retailer communicated a
proper disclaimer to the buyer.
C. Statutes of Limitations
In Texas the two-year statute of limitations governs actions for injury to
person or property 149 and is controlling in actions for negligence 50 and
strict liability in tort. 15 ' While the limitation period begins at the time of
the injury to person or property in a strict liability action, 52 Texas case
law does not clearly require the same result in a negligence action. One
court of appeals held, in a case in which the plaintiff only alleged loss of
the defective product itself, that the limitation period begins when the
buyer takes possession of the product. 153 In a similar situation in which a
product was leased and installed on the plaintiffs business premises by the
lessor, a court held that the limitation period began at the time of a fire
caused by the faulty product or improper installation, not at the time of
installation. 1-4
The UCC contains a special four-year statute of limitations 55 that is
the issue of whether the disclaimer would operate to deny plaintiff a recovery from the
remote sellers who did not appeal.
146. Comment, Contractual Disclaimers of Strict Tort Liability in Oregon, 18 WILLAMETTE L.J. 631, 657 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981)
(would allow exemption of seller's strict tort liability for injury to person or property if
disclaimer is fairly bargained for and not in violation of public policy).
147. Willoughby v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 601 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1979, no writ) (retailer applied herbicide on plaintiff's property; disclaimer on herbicide
container ineffective against plaintiff who had never seen container).
148. Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 547 S.W.2d 663, 667-68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1977, no writ) (only economic loss alleged); Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248,
251 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.) (only economic loss alleged).
149. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (VernOn Supp. 1984).
150. Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 152-53 (Tex. 1967).
151. Cleveland v. Square-D Co., 613 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ).
152. A line of federal court decisions has extended the discovery rule applicable in some
medical malpractice and fraudulent concealment cases to apply to strict tort liability cases.
Thus the limitation period in a strict tort liability action begins when the injury is or should
have been discovered. Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir.
1981) (injury from exposure to asbestos fibers); Roman v. A.H. Robins Co., 518 F.2d 970,
971 (5th Cir. 1975) (drug injury; application of discovery rule not essential to court's decision); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1102 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestosis); Thrift v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (drug injury).
153. Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 98-99 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971, writ ref d n.r.e.).
154. Sims v. Southland Corp., 503 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
155. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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consistent with the four-year limitations statute applicable to non-UCC
contract actions. 156 The Texas Supreme Court in Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc. ,157 held that the UCC limitation period, rather than the twoyear statute of limitations, governs actions for personal injury caused by a
breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 158 In so holding the
irrelevant the traditional distinctions between tort and
court deemed
59
contract.1
The Garcia court did not address the issue of time of accrual of a personal injury cause of action under the UCC warranty provisions. 160 The
court recited the period of time between the nonpurchaser's injury and the
filing of the lawsuit as controlling, yet mistakenly referred to the time of
injury as the time of sale. 16 1 If the court's holding is interpreted as not
allowing a seller his repose four years from the sale, a potentially unlim162
ited exposure to lawsuits by nonpurchasers could result.
Except for explicit warranties of future performance, the UCC plainly
states that a cause of action for breach of warranty accrues when the
tender of delivery is made, despite the claimant's lack of knowledge of the
breach. 63 A Texas federal district court applied pre-UCC case law in
place of explicit statutory wording and held that the cause of action accrues at the time of injury, not at the time of sale.' 64 Other jurisdictions
with identical statutes have criticized this decision. 165 The federal court
decision is particularly questionable since the Texas legislature was made
aware prior to enactment of the UCC that the UCC limitation provision
would abrogate the common law discovery rule.166 The Fifth Circuit and
a Texas court of appeals have therefore expressed the better interpretation
67
by holding that the UCC limitation period begins at tender of delivery.1
156. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
157. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
158. Id at 462.
159. Id. at 463. But see Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 82
(Tex. 1977) (recognizing that contract law should control recovery of economic losses, tort
law should control personal injury recovery).
160. Note, Garcia v. Texas Instruments: Another Hybrid Child is Born, 34 BAYLOR L.
REV. 67, 77 (1982).
161. 610 S.W.2d at 465.
162. See generally, Comment, Statutes of Repose in ProductsLiability" Death Before Con-

ception?, 37 Sw. L.J. 665, 675 (1983) (discussing problems of extended period of potential
liability for product manufacturers).
163. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
164. Morton v. Texas Welding & Mfg. Co., 408 F. Supp. 7, 11 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (fouryear period begins on date claimant discovered or should have discovered his injury); Roberts v. General Dynamics, 425 F. Supp. 688, 690 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (citing Morton).
165. See, e.g., Laporte v. F.D. Werner Co., 561 F. Supp. 189, 191-92 (N.D. Ill. 1983);
Teel v. American Steel Foundries, 529 F. Supp. 337, 342 n.l (E.D. Mo. 1981).
166. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 276.
167. Timberlane v. A.H. Robbins Co., 727 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1984) (personal
injury claim barred under Texas law); Garvie v. Duo-Fast, 711 F.2d 47, 48-49 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying Texas law to bar personal injury claim); Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp.,
639 F.2d 1320, 1324-25 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying Texas law to economic loss recovery, distinguishing the pre-UCC case law relied upon in Morton); Southerland v. Northeast Datsun,
Inc., 659 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ) (personal injury). The plaintiff
in Clark argued that an implied warranty was within the future performance exception of

COMMENTS

1984]
D.

Notice of Injury

A plaintiff is not required to give notice of his injury to the seller when a
lawsuit is tried on a negligence or strict liability theory. 68 The UCC, however, appears to bar recovery by any party asserting a claim for breach of
implied warranty if the party did not give notice of the breach to the seller
within a reasonable time.' 69 An official comment to the UCC notice provision explains that the notice requirement applies to claimants other than
the immediate buyer who sue under an implied warranty, and these claimants are held to use good faith in notifying the seller once they know of the
legal situation.' 70 Nevertheless, one court of appeals disregarded the official comment to the notice provision and held that a nonprivity purchaser
was not required to give any notice to either the immediate seller or the
remote manufacturer when only the manufacturer was sued. 171
III.

DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES: ARE THEY JUSTIFIED?

The current state of products liability law in Texas contains marked differences between causes of action for negligence, strict tort liability, and
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Solid legal reasoning
has supported the development of each theory of recovery. 172 Applying all
§ 2.725, starting the limitation period at the time of discovery of the breach. The Fifth
Circuit responded that "an implied warranty by its nature cannot 'explicitly extend to future
performance' and thus does not fall within that exception." Id at 1325. This literal interpretation of the statute has been accepted in other jurisdictions also. See, e.g., General
Motors Corp. v. Tate, 516 S.W.2d 602, 605-06 (Ark. 1974) (UCC limitation period held to

begin at tender of delivery in personal injury lawsuit under implied warranty); Johnson v.
Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154, 156-58 (Del. 1980) (implied warranty lawsuit filed
two years after personal injury but five years after purchase of allegedly defective tractor
barred by UCC § 2-725); Wilson v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 21 Ill. App. 3d 867, 315 N.E.2d
580, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (implied warranty cause of action barred by unambiguous language of § 2.725 running from time of delivery).
168. McLain v. Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment m (1965).
169. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). This section states that a "buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy." Id.
170. Id. comment 5; see Southwest Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Ross, 580 S.W.2d 2, 4-5
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1979, no writ); Import Motors, Inc. v. Matthews, 557
S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.); Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Morrison, 502 S.W.2d 196, 202-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ refd
n.r.e.).
171. Vintage Homes, Inc. v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1979, no writ) (buyer had complained to retailer, however, and manufacturer sent repairman
to attempt some repairs).
172. Several commentators, however, have analyzed the complex economic and jurisprudential issues of strict liability. See Calabrese, Optimal Deterrenceand Accidents, 84 YALE
L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055 (1972); Epstein, ProductsLiability.- The Searchfor the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
REV. 643 (1978); Hoenig, Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REV. 109 (1976); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and
Administration of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803 (1976);
Plant, Strict Liability of ManufacturersforInjuries Caused by Defects in Products-An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REV. 938 (1957); Posner, Strict Liability .4 Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUD.
205 (1973); Sachs, Negligence or Strict Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Eco-
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three theories to a single products liability case, however, has led to inconsistent and confused results. 73 Moreover, the uncertainty of products liability law is prompted by courts' improvisations of new legal rules that
foster needless litigation, adding to the social costs of a strained and overworked legal system. 174 Before proposing a system to simplify Texas products liability law, however, the three major products liability causes of
action should be scrutinized to determine where they are redundant and
where they are justifiably different.
A.

PartiesPotentially Liable

Determining whether a defendant is a seller of an allegedly defective
product plays a different role in each of the three major products liability
theories. Negligence liability is broader than strict liability and liability
for breach of warranty, since it alone extends to parties responsible for a
defective product that has not entered the stream of commerce. 175 When a
defendant introduces a defective product into the stream of commerce by
sale, negligence liability is again broader than strict liability and warranty
liability, which apply only to sellers who regularly sell the product in a
business context. 176 When a defendant introduces a defective product into
the stream of commerce by a nonsale transaction such as a lease, negligence liability, 177 as well as strict liability, 178 applies, but warranty liability
79
does not. 1
The broad scope of negligence liability for defective products stems
from the definition of negligence. In Texas negligence is defined as a failure to do what an ordinarily prudent person would have done in similar
circumstances or doing what an ordinarily prudent person would not have
done in similar circumstances. 8 0 With this focus on a party's conduct,
negligence in a products liability context involves product defectiveness
only to the extent that the defectiveness serves as the instrumentality between a manufacturer's negligent act or omission and a claimant's injury.
nomics?, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 259 (1978); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Wilson, ProductsLiability, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 809
(1955).
173. Note, supra note 5, at 64.
174. Bivens, The Products Liability Crisis. Modest Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 11
AKRON L. REV. 595, 597 (1978).
175. Wood v. Kane Boiler Works, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 172, 181 (Tex. 1951) (independent
contractor, hired to inspect pipe during manufacture and injured when defective pipe burst,
recovered under negligence theory).
176. The implied warranty of merchantability applies only to merchant sellers. TEX.
Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
177. Big Three Welding Equip. Co. v. Roberts, 399 S.W.2d 912, 916 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Lackey v. Perry, 366 S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Tex. Civ.
A p.-San Antonio 1963, no writ); Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. Toombs, 325 S.W.2d 153,
16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gibson, 298 S.W.2d 97, 105 (Tex. 1957); Vargas v. City of
San Antonio, 650 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ); Dickson v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ).
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As with product defectiveness, the form of a transaction that exposes a
claimant to a defective product is largely irrelevant in a negligence
analysis. Negligence liability therefore justifiably extends to nonsale
8
transactions. ' '
Sound policy also supports the application of strict tort liability in nonsale transactions. Strict tort liability is based in part on the policy that the
seller of a product must assume a special responsibility to meet the public
expectations of reasonably safe products in the marketplace. 8 2 Another
reason for imposing strict tort liability is to ensure that the costs of accidental injuries caused by unreasonably dangerous products are borne by
the sellers of the products, who can best spread the loss through liability
insurance and cost increases to the consumer.' 8 3 Consumers expect safe
products from lessors no less than from sellers, and a business can obtain
insurance and increase price whether the business involves leases or
sales. 184 The policies of strict tort liability, therefore, justify application of
this liability to nonsellers who are in the business of introducing products
into the stream of commerce. 8 5
Although application of an implied warranty of merchantability in
Texas to sales transactions only 8 6 has generated little controversy, some
jurisdictions expanded this implied warranty beyond the express wording 8 7 of article 2 of the UCC to apply to nonsale transactions. 188 When a
181. Sims v. Southland Corp., 503 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
183. Id
184. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex. 1975).
185. Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 84 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
186. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
187. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (warranty of
merchantability implied in a contract for "sale" of goods). "A 'sale' consists in the passing
of title from the seller to the buyer for a price." Id § 2.106.
188. See, e.g., Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Million & Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771 (D.
Wyo. 1973) (implied warranty held especially applicable to lease agreement for business
machines with option to purchase); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 327 F. Supp. 315
(W.D. Ark. 1971) (lease of broadcasting equipment), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 465 F.2d
1382 (8th Cir. 1972); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970) (lease of aircraft did
not preclude implied warranty recovery, lessee's recovery allowed on strict tort liability
grounds); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d 10 (1975) (lease
of refrigerated trailer); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965) (truck lease); see also Fender v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 138 Ga. App. 31, 225
S.E.2d 691 (1976) (exploding bottle injuring shopper before purchase; contract for sale need
not be executed for attachment of implied warranty); Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington CocaCola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975) (exploding bottle injuring shopper before
purchase); Gillespie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 187 S.E.2d 441 (1972)
(exploding bottle injured shopper before purchase). See generally Note, Implied Warranty
ProtectsSelf-Service Shopper Even Before She Pays RetailerFor Goods, 28 MERCER L. REV.
751, 759 (1977) (implied warranties may arise before purchase is made). See also J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 57, at 344, wherein the authors were willing to concede that a
manufacturer should be liable under an implied warranty to a shopper injured before a
product had actually been purchased, but they were less certain that an implied warranty
should extend to other nonbuying parties. "So bending the warranty law may be unnecessary where the consumer would have strict tort and negligence theories to rely on and where
such a distortion may have untoward effects in other circumstances." Id
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transaction involves an apparent lease with an option to purchase that effects a sale despite the rental format, 89 the extension of warranty liability
seems justified. One court, however, seized upon wording in a UCC comment that would leave undisturbed any case law on nonsale warranties 90
and implied a warranty in a genuine truck lease. 19 1 Another court interpreted the comment differently and held that the UCC did not bar extension of common law strict liability to an aircraft lessor. 192 A possible
explanation of this UCC comment is that express warranties in nonsale
transactions are not barred by the UCC, since the comment accompanies
the section providing for express warranties. Although logically a lessee of
a defective product would seem to be entitled to recover damages just as is
a purchaser of the same product, the Texas Legislature has not so provided. Until the legislature expressly creates an implied warranty remedy
in the nonsale context, therefore, the courts should not impose any further
common law liability other than that provided by the theories of negligence and strict tort liability.
Even as applied to sales transactions, the liability theories diverge on the
issue of liability for defects in used products. Negligence liability recognizes no distinction between new and used products since the liability
stems from the seller's negligent conduct. 193 While attaching negligence
liability in a used product sales context is justified under present Texas
law, the policies of strict tort liability are strained in their application to
sellers of used products. Unlike the consumer expectations attending the
purchase of a new product, a buyer generally neither expects as much from
nor pays as much for a product that he knows is used.'94 Moreover, without the distribution chain of a new product that ideally leads to a "deep
pocket" manufacturer, the seller of used products will not be able to pass
on the liability for defects created during use of the product by the original
or subsequent consumers.' 95 The court that extended strict tort liability to
189. Quality Acceptance Corp. v. Million & Albers, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 771 (D. Wyo.
1973) (lease with enforceable option to purchase); KLPR TV, Inc. v. Visual Elec. Corp., 327
F. Supp. 315, 322-24 (W.D. Ark. 1971) (lease with option to purchase enforceable by lessor
held analogous to sale); Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 215 S.E.2d
10, 16-18 (1975) (lease at issue held equivalent to sale).
190. The comment provides:
Although this section is limited in its scope and direct purpose to warranties
made by the seller to the buyer as part of a contract for sale, the warranty
sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb those lines of
case law growth which have recognized that warranties need not be confined
• . . to sales contracts. . . . They may arise in other appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for hire.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 comment 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (section deals
with express warranties).
191. Cintron v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769, 775-79
(1965). The court noted, however, that in this personal injury action strict tort liability
would have been a more appropriate remedy, perhaps suggesting that the court allowed the
warranty claim only to give the plaintiff a chance to amend his pleadings on remand. Id
192. Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 327 (Alaska 1970).
193. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
194. Sales & Perdue, supra note 35, at 103.
195. Id.
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a used brick seller did not discuss these policies. 196 Other jurisdictions
have considered the issue in more depth and have rejected the extension of
also restrict tort liability to used product sellers. 197 Texas courts should
198
fuse to apply strict tort liability to sellers of used products.
Despite the liability imposed on sellers of used products under the theories of negligence and strict tort liability, the Texas courts have not extended liability under an implied warranty of merchantability to sellers of
used products.' 99 The drafters of the UCC commented that the contract
description of secondhand goods should determine the seller's obligation. 2°° When a seller describes a product as used, Texas courts have
properly refused to imply a warranty of merchantability. 20 ' The supreme
court missed an opportunity to comment on this issue in Mid Continent
Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Service. 202 The court denied warranty liability for a defective, used aircraft because of a valid disclaimer,
but failed to discuss whether an implied warranty of merchantability
would have otherwise applied. 20 3 Other jurisdictions have implied a warranty in the sale of a used product in situations in which the buyer relied
on the judgment of the seller. 2° 4 Such situations properly give rise to a
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under the UCC, 20 5 regardless
of the used nature of a product. 20 6 Since the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose provides a remedy, the Texas courts should continue to
refuse to apply an implied warranty of merchantability to used product
sales and thereby avoid adding to the already confused state of products
liability law.
196. Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no
writ).
197. See, e.g., Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185, 187 (1975) (automobile
salvage business); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785, 787
(1975) (used car dealer); Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 844 (Miss.
197 1) (seller of scrap iron).
198. See generally Sales & Perdue, supra note 35, at 102-05 (recommending that courts
consider consumer reliance before imposing strict tort liability on used product dealers and
stating that imposition of strict tort liability when a defect is within the reasonable expectation of a consumer is contrary to the policies of strict tort liability).
199. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
200. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 comment 3 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (stating that seller's obligation should be "appropriate" for the contract description of the used
goods).
201. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
202. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
203. Id at 313.
204. See Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 I11.App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168
(1972). But see Comment, UCC Implied Warranty of Merchantabilityand Used Goods, 26
BAYLOR L. REV. 630, 641 (1974) (arguing that sales of used products should be subject to
implied warranty of merchantability).
205. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). This warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose might have applied in Mid Continent were it not for a valid
disclaimer. See 572 S.W.2d at 313. Further discussion of the implied warranty of fitness for
a particular purpose is beyond the scope of this Comment.
206. See generally 3 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES § 19-9 (4th ed.
1974) (stating that implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose applies to sale of used
as well as new goods).
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All three products liability theories apply to sales by merchants of new
products. A merchant is defined in the UCC as a person who deals in
goods of the kind alleged to be defective. 20 7 Only sellers who are
merchants are potentially liable for a breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability. 20 8 Strict tort liability, which applies to sellers engaged in
the business of selling a product alleged to be defective, 20 9 is coextensive
with the UCC for this class of potentially liable parties. Neither strict tort
210
liability nor implied warranty apply to an isolated or occasional sale.
The extension of two forms of liability based on the defective nature of a
product to the same class of merchant sellers, plus the availability of negligence liability based on a defendant's conduct, is justifiable when different
classes of plaintiffs may exercise the different legal theories. But when the
same class of plaintiffs may obtain a remedy under all three theories of
recovery against the same class of merchant sellers, the redundancy and
confusion in products liability law becomes particularly pronounced.
B. Parties Who May Recover
A party with an injury caused by the defective nature of a product may
seek a recovery in Texas under the theories of negligence, strict tort liability, and implied warranty of merchantability without regard to privity. Although the foreseeability requirement within the proximate causation
standard of negligence2 1 ' and implied warranty2 1 2 theoretically reduces
the class of potential plaintiffs relative to the producing cause standard of
strict tort liability,2 13 the Texas courts have allowed recovery to injured
bystanders under all three theories without difficulty. 21 4 While privity is
not required for recovery in tort, absence of privity often bars recovery in
contract.2 1 5 Recovery by nonprivity plaintiffs under an implied warranty
of merchantability therefore appears contrary to the otherwise contractual
nature of the UCC.
207. Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or

skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.

TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.104(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
208. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); 3 R. ANDERSON supra note 104, § 2-314:52.
209. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Urquidez, 570 S.W.2d 374, 375 (Tex. 1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment f (1965).
210. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 comment 3 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); RE§ 402A comment f (1965).
211. See supra notes 13 & 66 and accompanying text.

STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

212. See supra notes 66 & 86 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 66, 71 & 77 and accompanying text.
214. See Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456, 465 (Tex. 1980) (implied

warranty); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969) (strict tort liability);
South Austin Drive-In Theatre v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933, 949-50 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1967, writ refd n.r.e.) (negligence).
215. Graham v. Turcotte, 628 S.W.2d 182, 183 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ); Republic Nat'l Bank v. National Banker's Life Ins. Co., 427 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. Civ.
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The law of sales governs the economic relations between buyers and
sellers of goods, and strict tort liability controls the separate problem of
physical injuries. 2 16 Only plaintiffs in privity with a seller should recover
damages for inferior quality of a product since these damages depend on
the terms of the bargain between buyer and seller.2 17 The UCC provisions
allowing recovery for property damage and personal injury as consequential damages 2' 8 do not contradict the privity-only nature of sales law, but
instead provide a simple vehicle for a buyer in privity to recover for both
economic and physical injury in a single cause of action, rather than in
separate contract and tort actions.
Recovery for physical injury under the UCC is a remnant of a more
tort-flavored implied warranty proposed in the second draft of the Revised
Uniform Sales Act, 219 an ancestor of the sales chapter in the Texas
UCC.220 The Sales Act draft would have extended warranty protection for
injury to person or property to any legitimate user of a defective product, 2 2 1 whereas the proposed Texas UCC would have protected only persons in the family or household of the buyer, and only for personal
injury. 222 The Texas legislature failed to enact either proposal. The implied warranty of merchantability, as enacted in Texas, merely codified
case law that had implied a warranty of merchantability only between parties in privity of contract, 223 leaving the development of nonprivity implied
224
warranty in tort to the courts.
The Texas Supreme Court's first decision on the privity question was
Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers. 225 The issue of liability of a
remote manufacturer arose because an intermediate retailer had gone out
of business and was not a party to the suit. The buyer claimed that defects
in workmanship and materials reduced the market value of a mobile home
to less than its purchase price, and the trial court found a difference of
$8,750 between market value and purchase price. 226 Strict tort liability
could not apply since the mobile home was not unreasonably dangerous
App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gehl Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Price's Producers, Inc., 319
S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1958, no writ).
Dean Prosser once stated: "No one doubts that, unless there is privity, liability to the
consumer must be in tort and not in contract." Prosser, supra note 20, at 1134.
216. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21
(1965); see W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 97, at 655; Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 1, 6 (1979).
217. Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412, 424 (1973); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 (1955), aff'dmem.,
2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956).
218. TEX. Bus & CoM. CODE ANN. § 2.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
219. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Preemptedby the UCC
and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 132 nn. 16 & 17 (1974).
220. See id at 135.
221. See id at 132 n.17.
222. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 105.
223. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
225. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.1977).
226. Id at 78.
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and did not cause injury to the plaintiff's person or other property. 227 The
supreme court, however, allowed the nonprivity buyer to recover his eco228
nomic loss under an implied warranty of merchantability.
The court reasoned that since a nonprivity claimant could recover for
personal injury caused by an unreasonably dangerous product by the application of strict tort liability, then for fairness and consistency a nonprivity claimant should also recover for economic loss due to the defective but
not dangerous nature of a product under the implied warranty of
merchantability. 2 29 The court envisioned a claimant losing his entire life
savings due to the reduced value of a defective product and postulated that
230
this economic loss could be as disastrous as physical injury.
The court's stated rationale for extending implied warranty protection to
nonprivity buyers, however, is not convincing. Public policy justifies elimination of a privity requirement in support of strict tort liability's primary
purpose of protecting the public from dangerous products. 23 ' Even though
a damage award for loss of a leg or a life may equal an award for economic loss when expressed in dollars and cents, this pecuniary value is no
more than a compromise to the fact that human suffering and death cannot
truly be quantified. 232 Strict tort liability therefore protects the public
from dangerous products that cause either minor or major personal injuries, but does not offer a remedy for even huge economic losses.
Yet strict liability does not protect a plaintiff personally injured by a
product not unreasonably dangerous, even if this plaintiff is in privity with
the seller of the product. While professing to forge a remedy consistent
with strict tort liability, the Nobility court's reasoning oversteps the policies
of strict tort liability. This reasoning would allow a recovery for injury
caused by a product not unreasonably dangerous, first when the product
causes physical injury and then when the product causes purely economic
injury. While professing an intent to keep contract law and tort law separate, 23 3 the court misapplied tort policy to an historically contractual remedy in Texas in its eager "assault upon the citadel of privity.' ' z3 4
The Nobility court decided that limiting a buyer to a cause of action
against his immediate seller would encourage manufacturers to sell to consumers through low-capital collapsible corporations.2 35 As authority for
this proposition the court cited to an admittedly exaggerated hypothetical
227. Id. at 79-80.
228. Id at 81.
229. Id
230. Id

231. See Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Tex. 1969); Keeton, Torts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 18 (1981); Sales, supra note 123, at 773.
232. See Note, supra note 5, at 98 (freedom from death and suffering should be the pri-

mary concern in products liability law).
233. 557 S.W.2d at 82.
234. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 491, 445 (1931).

235. 557 S.W.2d at 81-82. A collapsible corporation, in this non-tax context, is one that
ceases to exist when all of the goods in its inventory are sold. See id; Roberts, The Case of
the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 835, 835-36

(1967).
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in a law review article. 236 Although the hypothetical concerned real estate
development corporations that dissolved after the last house of a development was sold, low-capital retail outlets with a nonrenewable stock of
goods are also conceivable. Even if the court's fears of fly-by-night retailers of consumer goods is well-founded, this reasoning does not explain
saddling a remote manufacturer with the responsibilities of the retailer to
sell a product at a price commensurate with its value. A UCC comment
states that the selling price of a product provides an excellent indication of
the degree of quality a merchant is obligated to furnish.237 This comment
is in accordance with the measure of damages for breach of warranty
under the UCC, which is the difference between the value of the product
as received and the value of the product as warranted. 238 Thus if a manufacturer sells a product of inferior quality to a wholesaler for $100, its actual value, the wholesaler has suffered no loss, and the manufacturer is
liable for no damages. But if a consumer eventually buys the product from
a hard-bargaining retailer for $1000, when its retail value is only $200, the
consumer has suffered a substantial loss, yet the manufacturer should not
be liable for damages. Regardless of whether the retailer, and any other
intermediate dealers, are solvent by the time the consumer brings suit, 23 9

the Nobility holding would allow the consumer to recover the difference
between his purchase price and the actual retail value directly from the
manufacturer. 240 This imposition of liability on the manufacturer for a
consumer's bad bargain with a retailer demonstrates that the court in Nobility embraced the deep-pocket theory. 24 1
Once the Nobility decision allowed remote consumers to recover any
excess price paid for a defective product under an implied warranty of
merchantability, the supreme court found it easy to extend this implied
warranty to protect nonpurchasers from personal injury in Garciav. Texas
Instruments, Inc. 242 The plaintiff in Garcia suffered acid burns when he
fell while carrying glass containers of sulfuric acid, which the plaintiffs
employer had purchased from the defendant. The court could have based
236. "[I]t may be better to launch this enterprise with a short, and somewhat exaggerated
scenario." Roberts, supra note 235, at 835.
237. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 comment 7 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
238. Id § 2.714(b).
239. In Nobility no showing was made of the retailer's insolvency; he was not a party to
the suit because he could not be found. Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 539
S.W.2d 190, 191 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976), afl'd, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
240. 539 S.W.2d at 195 (Keith, J., dissenting).
241. Id at 196 (Keith, J., dissenting). One of the justifications proposed by Dean Prosser
in support of strict liability in tort was that liability of the manufacturer directly to the
consumer would eliminate a multiplicity of suits for indemnity involving dealers intermediate to the manufacturer and consumer. Prosser, supra note 20, at 1123-24. This justification
fails to recognize that the same series of lawsuits can occur is reverse order due to contractual indemnity agreements when a manufacturer is initially liable to a consumer. Additionally, a manufacturer initially held liable for a consumer's economic loss for breach of
warranty would appear to have a cause of action in equity via subrogation against any intermediate dealers who contributed to the disparity between the consumer's cost and the actual
value of the warranted product.
242. 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980).
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this plaintiffs recovery on his employment relationship with the buyer,
who was in privity with the defendant. This limited nonpurchaser exception would generally follow the proposed Texas UCC provision that would
have allowed a recovery for personal injury to household guests of the
immediate buyer. 24 3 Instead the court held that privity was not a require244
ment in an action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.
In completely eliminating privity as a bar to recovery under an implied
warranty of merchantability, the court again confused contract law and
tort law and justified its holding with the rationale that supported extension of strict tort liability protection to bystanders. 245 This extension of
strict tort liability was based on a product's unreasonably dangerous nature. 246 Since a nonprivity plaintiff suffering personal injury may bring a
cause of action in strict tort liability or negligence, the court's only reason
for giving a nonprivity plaintiff another route to recovery was that the legislature had delegated the privity question to the courts. 247 The court's
holding thus neatly sidestepped the long established two-year statute of
limitations for personal injuries, 248 which barred the plaintiff's otherwise
possible negligence and strict24tort
liability claims, and applied the four9
year UCC limitations period.
While the UCC clearly allows recovery for personal injury, 250 it does
not mandate extension of an implied warranty cause of action to bystanders. Negligence and strict tort actions adequately protect a nonprivity
claimant who deserves compensation for personal injuries. An additional
cause of action coextensive with strict tort liability25' merely confuses the
litigation of defective product cases and provides the unjustified bonus of a
2
four-year limitation period. 25
243. See supra text accompanying note 91; see generally, 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 104,
at 2-314:118 (discussing recovery by employees of a buyer under implied warranty).
244. 610 S.W.2d at 465.
245. Id. The court cited as authority Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630, 633
(Tex. 1969), which had extended strict tort liability to protect bystanders. See supra note 47
and accompanying text.
246. The Garcia court stated: "A manufacturer who places in commerce a product rendered dangerous to life or limb by reason of some defect is strictly liable in tort to one who
sustains injury because of the defective condition." 610 S.W.2d at 465 (quoting Darryl, 440
S.W.2d at 633). The court also quoted from the dissenting opinion of Colvin v. FMC Corp.,
43 Or. App. 709, 604 P.2d 157 (1979), which postulated a warranty of safety imposed by the
UCC analogous to strict tort liability. Id at 162 (Thornton, J., and Lee, J., dissenting); see

also Keeton, supra note 231, at 18 (Strict tort liability developed principally to guard against
dangerousness of product).
247.
248.
249.
155-59

610 S.W.2d at 465. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see supra notes
and accompanying text.

250. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.715(b)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); see supra
text accompanying note 101. Dean Keeton has recommended eliminating personal injury
recovery from the UCC implied warranty provision. Keeton, supra note 231, at 19.
251. Keeton, supra note 231, at 18.
252. Anderson v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 358 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D. Alaska 1973).
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C Defenses
With the recent adoption of comparative causation in Duncan v. Cessna
Aircraft Co. ,253 a plaintiffs negligent conduct reduces his recovery whether
he sues under a theory of negligence, strict tort liability, or implied warranty of merchantability.2 54 This commonality eliminates one of the conceptual and practical difficulties in Texas products liability law, yet
differences between the defenses to the three major products liability theories still exist. The differences in applicable defenses in turn reflect some
fundamental differences in the justifiable scope of the three products liability causes of action.
Disclaimers of liability are effective in Texas under proper circumstances regardless of whether a plaintiff brings a products liability action 25in5
negligence, strict tort liability, or implied warranty of merchantability.
While Texas appellate courts have not addressed all disclaimer issues, the
same considerations of public policy influence disclaimer enforcement decisions under all of the three major products liability theories.2 56 Absent
fraud or illegality in a transaction, the most significant policy ground for
denying enforcement to a disclaimer of liability appears to be substantially
unequal bargaining power.2 57 The supreme court expressly invalidated a
negligence disclaimer on the ground of unequal bargaining power, 258 but
other decisions at least imply that the same ground would serve to invalidate disclaimers of strict tort or implied warranty liability.
The Texas Supreme Court in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry
County Spraying Service, Inc. 259 stated that the rights and remedies provided by the UCC should not be nullified by application of strict tort liability in derrogation of a contractual allocation of liability.2 60 Although
the case involved only economic loss which the court held was not recoverable under strict liability in any event,2 61 the court's statement implies that
a disclaimer of strict liability for any type of damages would be enforceable against a commercial buyer.
Other jurisdictions have held that such disclaimers are enforceable between commercial parties of equal bargaining strength. 262 These decisions
253. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
254. See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
256. See Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. 1973); Wade v. Austin,
524 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
257. Crowell v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. 1973); Wade v. Austin, 524
S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
258. CroweU v. Housing Auth., 495 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. 1973).
259. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
260. Id at 312.
261. Id. at 313.
262. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th
Cir. 1974) (unambiguous disclaimer of negligence and strict tort liability enforceable under

California law between corporate giants in economic loss case); Keystone Aeronautics Corp.
v. R.J. Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1974) (Pennsylvania law permitting "freely
negotiated and clearly expressed waiver of § 402A between business entities of relatively
equal bargaining strength"); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d
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suggest that the courts would enforce disclaimers of strict tort liability for
injury to a buyer's property other than the defective product itself against a
capable commercial buyer, but not enforce these disclaimers against consumers or other buyers with little bargaining power.
Although the UCC appears to support enforceability of a broader range
of disclaimers of liability than does the common law of negligence and
strict tort liability,2

63

a UCC provision denying effect to unconscionable

clauses 264

contract
reflects the same public policy as the common law. 265
This unconscionability provision 266 does not expressly apply to disclaimers
of implied warranties, but commentators have convincingly argued that
this provision bars enforcement of unconscionable disclaimers of implied
warranties just as it bars enforcement of any other unconscionable contract
clauses. 267 The UCC appears to rule all disclaimers of personal injury unconscionable, but does not specifically address other criteria for determining unconscionability. Because unconscionability is not otherwise defined
in the UCC, courts must look to the common law of contracts, which considers the lack of a buyer's bargaining
power as an important element on
268
the issue of unconscionability.
Since a buyer's bargaining power plays a part in the determination of
enforceability of a disclaimer of liability regardless of which theory of recovery a claimant presents, the issue of enforceability of a disclaimer can
95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518, 523 (1965) (clear negligence disclaimer enforceable between freely
negotiating parties); see generally McNichols, Who Says That Strict Tort Disclaimers Can
Never Be Effective? The Courts Cannot Agree, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 494, 528-29 (1975) (strict
tort liability primarily designed for consumer protection, so knowledgeable corporations
should be able to disclaim the liability freely).
263. The UCC allows exclusion of all implied warranties. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.316(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The UCC does not, however, authorize all
disclaimers. See id comment I (purpose of § 2.316 to protect buyer from unexpected and
unbargained disclaimer). Disclaimers must be part of the bargain or they are unenforceable.
International Harvester Co. v. Pike, 249 Ark. 1026, 466 S.W.2d 901, 907 (1971); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195, 198-200 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1968); Dobias v. Western Farmers Ass'n, 6 Wash. App. 194, 491 P.2d 1346, 1350 (1971). See

generally 1 R.

ALDERMAN, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE § 1.38-21 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing requirements for an enforceable disclaimer).
264. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
265. See Shanker, supra note 6, at 565.
266. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.179(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
267. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 57, at 475-81; Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 793 (1969); Murray, Unconscionability" Unconscionability, 31
U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 45 (1969); Weintraub, Disclaimer of Warrantiesand Limitation of Damagesfor Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TEX. L. REV. 60, 82 (1974). But see Leff,
Unconscionabilityand the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 523
(1967) (arguing that valid disclaimer under UCC § 2-316 cannot be unconscionable under
UCC § 2-302). Federal legislation eliminates this problem in many consumer cases by requiring that any limitation of an implied warranty for a consumer product costing more
than $15 be conscionable, set forth in clear and unmistakable language, and prominently
displayed on the face of any written warranty. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1975, § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982).
268. See Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ)
(looking at entire context of agreement, alternatives available at time of contract formation,
nonbargaining ability of plaintiff, or illegal, oppressive or unreasonable nature of the contract to determine unconscionability).
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only logically arise when a claimant has participated in a bargaining transaction. Disclaimers arise, therefore, only in a contractual setting and, if
enforceable, bar a claimant from recovering under any of the three products liability theories. In a contractual setting when a buyer alleges a defect in a product, the seller's express disclaimer of any express or implied
representations of the quality of the product should be examined under the
statutory disclaimer and unconscionability provisions of the UCC. Since
the UCC provides for an effective disclaimer other than by express disclaimer, as by a buyer's course of dealing 269 or a buyer's refusal to inspect
and failure to discover patent defects, 270 the issue of disclaimer will almost
always arise when a buyer alleges a product defect. The UCC should control the resolution of disclaimer issues in a buyer's products liability suit,
but should not necessarily control the other liability issues of the case. Accordingly, when a claimant is in privity of contract with the defendant
seller of a defective product, the theories of negligence or strict tort liability
should not be applied to impose liability on the seller in contravention of a
with
disclaimer of liability for product defectiveness made in accordance
27
the disclaimer and unconscionability provisions of the UCC. 1
When a party injured by a defective product did not buy or lease the
product, the issue of disclaimer should not arise at all. Since such a bystander or user has participated in no bargaining transaction, public policy
should deny enforcement of any remote disclaimers due to this ultimate
example of a claimant's lack of bargaining power. To avoid the anamolous result of allowing a bystander to recover under an implied warranty
from the manufacturer of a defective product while denying the immediate
purchaser a recovery due to a valid disclaimer, nonpurchasing bystanders
and users should have a right to only the tort remedies of negligence and
strict liability. Similarly, buyers suing a remote manufacturer should bring
a cause of action in negligence or strict tort liability, rather than implied
warranty, because of the lack of privity with the manufacturer. These tort
actions against the remote seller would supplement the same buyer's cause
of action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability against his
immediate seller and should be subject to any disclaimers for which the
buyer has bargained.
Just as enforcement of a disclaimer of liability should occur only when
the disclaimer is the product of contractual dealings, the special four-year
UCC statute of limitations should apply only to a cause of action arising
from contractual dealings. 27 2 A four-year limitation period, which is applicable in Texas by a general statute of limitations to non-UCC causes of
action founded in contract, 273 may reflect the drafter's oversight in not spe269. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(c)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (providing
also for disclaimer by course of performance or usage of trade).
270. See id § 2.316(c)(2).
271. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir.
1974).
272. See supra notes 155-67 and accompanying text.
273. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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cifically considering the applicability of the UCC to personal injuries,
which would otherwise give rise to a cause of action in tort with a two-year
limitation period. 274 The available legislative history shows that the Texas
Legislature recognized that the UCC limitation period would change the
prior statutory period for suits on oral contracts, 275 and that the initiation
of the UCC period at tender of delivery would abrogate the prior common
law discovery rule. 276 The legislature did not mention, however, the
change to the two-year tort limitations period. Assuming the drafters had
considered the issue, the UCC four-year period may reflect an intent that
only those injuries founded in classical contract circumstances would be
controlled by the UCC limitation period. Since privity is generally a requirement in a contract action, the four-year provision could be applied
only to those personal injury suits in which a plaintiff and defendant are in
privity of contract. At least one jurisdiction has construed the UCC in this
manner. 277 The explicit wording of the UCC limitation provision that it
applies to actions for breach of sales contracts and that the period begins to
run at tender of delivery for implied warranty actions, 278 supports this result. These limitation provisions can be a benchmark only for parties involved in the sale and delivery of a product and therefore in privity with
279
the purchaser.
Like the UCC limitation provisions, the UCC requirement that a seller
be given reasonable notice of breach of an implied warranty 28 0 is strained
in its application to parties not in privity of contract. When a bystander or
remote buyer is entitled to a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability, other jurisdictions have concluded that the UCC
obligates the plaintiff to give reasonable notice of the breach to the defendant seller, regardless of absence of privity, at least when the plaintiff suffers
only economic loss. 28 1 The single Texas court of appeals ruling on the
274. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 57, at 416.
275. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 274; M. Ruud, supra note 90.
276. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 276.
277. Eg., Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 373 A.2d 492, 495 (R.I. 1977). The

Rhode Island UCC allows recovery under implied warranty for personal injury to a nonprivity plaintiff. The Rhode Island courts have held, however, that recovery by a nonprivity
plaintiff is governed by a general two-year tort statute of limitation because the UCC fouryear period is not applied in nonprivity cases. Id
278. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
279. See Note, supra note 5, at 81-82. Two state statutes specifically addressed the applicability of the four-year UCC limitation period to personal injury claims under an implied
warranty by nonprivity plaintiffs. Alabama, which allows only damages for personal injury
to a nonprivity plaintiff, ALA. CODE § 7-2-318 (1977), further begins the four-year limitation
period at the time of injury. Id § 7-2-725. Maine specifically states that a cause of action

for personal injuries under the UCC implied warranty accrues at the time of injury. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-725 (1964). A cause of action under the implied warranty theory is controlled by ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752 (1980), the general six-year statute of
limitations.
280. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
281. Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 292 (Alaska 1976); Western

Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980); J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 57, § 11-10, at 424-25; Clark, The First Line of Defense in Warranty
Suits: Failureto Give Notice of Breach, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 105, 126-29 (1982). In cases involving
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issue, which did not require notice to a remote seller, 282 contradicts the
legislative intent expressed in the official comment that accompanies the
UCC notice provision. 283 The court's holding, however, is largely due to
the wording of the notice provision. 284 While the official comment imposes the notice requirement on nonpurchaser claimants, the statutory section mentions only the buyer's duty of notice. 2 5 This inconsistency again
indicates that the drafters designed the notice provision, and the cause of
action for breach of implied warranty of merchantability to which it applies, for use between parties in privity. Limiting the availability of an
implied warranty of merchantability cause of action to parties in privity of
contract with a defendant seller would restore rationality to the UCC notice provisions, as well as the disclaimer and limitation period provisions.
The confusion in Texas products liability law currently appears to stem
largely from the extension of liability for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability to sellers not in privity of contract with a injured plaintiff.
This extension allows a plaintiff injured by a defective product to sue a
remote seller, if he sold the product when it was new, under three theories
of liability. Allowing a nonprivity plaintiff to bring a third cause of action
needlessly complicates products liability litigation and gives some plaintiffs an unjustified escape route around the two-year statute of limitations
imposed on negligence and strict tort liability causes of action. The implied warranty action against a remote seller also allows a plaintiff to recover the economic loss he suffers in a bad bargain from a party who
played no part in that bargain. 286 Even strict tort liability, which bases the
imposition of liability for a nonprivity plaintiffs damages on a policy of
encouraging the manufacture of safe products, does not allow a recovery
for economic loss when the only damage caused by an unreasonably dangerous product is to the product itself. Since the public policy underlying
strict tort liability does not allow recovery for economic loss to an unreasonably dangerous product, then no other policy but a thinly disguised
policy of finding a deep pocket explains a nonprivity plaintiffs ability to
recover under an implied warranty for economic loss to a product that is
not even dangerous.
The implied warranty of merchantability historically has been available
a personal injury recovery, several jurisdictions do not impose the UCC notice requirement.
Simmons v. Clemco Indus., 368 So. 2d 509, 513-15 (Ala. 1979); Tomczuk v. Town of
Cheshire, 217 A.2d 71, 73-74 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965); Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 194 S.E.2d 513, 515 (Ga. App. Ct. 1972); Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 368 A.2d 993, 996-97
(Md. 1977).
282. Vintage Homes v. Coldiron, 585 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1977,
no writ).
283. The comment states that "[u]nder this Article various beneficiaries are given rights
for injuries sustained by them because of the seller's breach of warranty . . .; but even a
beneficiary can be properly held to the use of good faith in notifying, once he has become
aware of the legal situation." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607 comment 5 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
284. Id. § 2.607(c)(1) ("the buyer" must notify).
285. Id.
286. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
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only to a plaintiff in privity with a defendant seller. The UCC provisions
for disclaimer, limitation period, and notice all reflect the contractual nature of the implied warranty cause of action and are all ill-suited in their
application to parties not in privity of contract with a defendant seller. A
measure of rationality and simplicity should be returned to products liability law. The implied warranty of merchantability should obligate a seller
only to his immediate buyer and not to any plaintiffs that are not in privity
with the seller.
IV.

PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT

Both the Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature have the
power to impose privity of contract as a requirement for recovery under
the UCC implied warranty of merchantability theory. 287 The supreme
court, however, must adhere to the case-by-case method of judicial review
and await a proper case for resolution of the privity issue. 288 A change of
such broad scope seems best left to the Texas Legislature.
The legislatures of a majority of states addressing the privity issue have
enacted a UCC provision similar to that originally proposed, but not enacted, in Texas.289 In those states, therefore, only the buyer and foresee287. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
288. Not all courts feel constrained to the case-by-case method ofjudicial review. Rabin
& Grossman, Defective Productsor Realty CausingEconomic Loss.: Toward a Unified Theory
of Recovery, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 5, 47-48 (1981) (criticizing the propensity of some courts to
disregard the limitations of judicial review and pronounce new rules of law unnecessary for
deciding the case at hand, thereby legislating by dictum without benefit of staff studies or
legislative hearings).
The Texas Supreme Court has announced on occasion new products liability law in elaborate dicta. In Nobility the extension of liability under an implied warranty to a remote
manufacturer for economic loss was unnecessary, since the manufacturer was found liable
for this loss under a negligence theory and did not appeal the negligence issue. Nobility
Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. 1977). The creation of the misuse
defense to strict liability in General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977),
was also unnecessary, because the defendant had not pleaded misuse at trial or on appeal
and was found liable without application of the new misuse defense. Id at 352. The adoption of comparative fault as a defense to strict liability in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665
S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984), was unnecessary since the court held that the defendant had,
through a procedural error, waived the right to exercise the defense. Id at 432-33. The
extension of strict tort liability for injury to a defective product itself when the product also
caused injury to a plaintiff's person or other property in Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal
Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978), was unnecessary because strict tort liability could
not be imposed in that case due to the absence of a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 326.
289. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, supra note 91, at 105 and accompanying text. Twentyseven states and the District of Columbia extend implied warranty protection beyond the
immediate buyer to cover only personal injury to foreseeable users or consumers who are
natural persons in the family of the buyer or in the buyer's household as guests. ALASKA
STAT. § 45.02.318 (1980); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2335 (1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 42a-2-318 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:2-318 (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 109A-2-318
(Supp, 1982); IDAHO CODE § 28-2-318 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-318 (Smith-Hurd
1963); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-318 (Bums 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-318
(Bobbs-Merrill 1972); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-318 (1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.

§ 440.2318 (West 1967); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-318 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.2-318
(Vernon 1965); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-318 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. U.C.C. § 2.318

(1980); NEV. REV. STAT. § 104.2318 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-318 (West 1962); N.M.
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able users of a defective product who are natural persons in the buyer's
family or in the buyer's household as guests may recover under an implied
warranty of merchantability cause of action. The extension of implied
warranty protection to even this limited class of nonprivity claimants,
however, creates several new factual issues to be resolved before a claimant is entitled to a recovery. The multiple issues of whether a claimant is a
member of a buyer's family or a guest of the buyer's household and a
foreseeable user would often require a determination by the finder of fact.
Thus a plaintiff could often litigate a breach of warranty claim to a jury
verdict only to be denied recovery for lack of a favorable finding on his
relationship to the buyer. Litigating the warranty theory with the negligence and strict tort liability theories would cause the needless confusion
that courts and commentators have sought to avoid.
Since negligence and strict tort liability causes of action offer a remedy
to a buyer's family members and household guests, only the buyer himself
should be allowed a recovery under an implied warranty of
merchantability. This no-exceptions privity of contract requirement would
accord with the contractual history of the implied warranty of
merchantability cause of action in Texas. 290 The UCC provisions on disclaimer, limitation period, and notice would again be applied, as designed,
only to immediate buyers, who may bargain for allocation of risk of a
product defect, who are aware of the tender of delivery that starts the limitation period, and who know the identity of the seller to whom notice of
injury is owed.
Privity of contract as a requirement for recovery also should reduce litigation confusion since it presents a clearer factual issue than the limited
nonprivity requirement. Fewer plaintiffs would be uncertain of a verdict
§ 55-2-318 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-318 (1965); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1302.31 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (West 1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 72.3180 (1981); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2318 (Purdon Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-2-318 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2-318 (1966); W. VA. CODE § 46-2-318
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 402.318 (West 1964).
One state further extends the protection to employees, servants, or agents of the buyer.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.318 (West Supp. 1984). Covering more nonprivity plaintiffs, five
STAT. ANN.

states and the Virgin Islands extend implied warranty protection beyond the immediate
buyer to cover only personal injury to any foreseeable user or consumer. ALA. CODE § 7-2318 (1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-2-318 (1983); N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-318 (McKinney Supp.
1983-1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-318 (1966); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. I IA, § 2-318 (Supp.
1983); WYO. STAT. § 34-21-235 (1977). One state extends implied warranty protection beyond the immediate buyer to cover only injury to the person or property of a natural person.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (Law. Co-op. 1976). Another state extends implied warranty
protection beyond the immediate buyer to cover any injury to a natural person. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2-318 (1975).
Finally, twelve states maximize implied warranty protection by extending it to cover any
injury to any person. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.1 (Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2318 (1974); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 490-2-318 (1976); IOWA CODE § 554.2318 (Supp. 19831984); ME. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-318 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-318
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-318 (West Supp. 1984); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-318 (Supp. 1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-35 (1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6A-2-318 (Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-2-318 (1980); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70A-2-318 (1980); VA. CODE § 8.2-318 (1965).

290. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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on a privity issue than, for example, on a "foreseeable user" issue. Thus
fewer plaintiffs would be enticed to litigate an implied warranty theory to
an unfavorable verdict and would instead focus on the traditional nonprivity theories of negligence and strict tort liability. The clearer factual issue
of privity should also allow more unmeritorious implied warranty claims
to be dismissed at the trial court level by summary judgment. Requiring
privity for a breach of an implied warranty claim should serve to simplify
products liability litigation and to allow more efficient and consistent resolution of a nonprivity plaintiff's valid negligence and strict tort liability
claims.
Requiring privity in an implied warranty of merchantability cause of
action would necessitate amendment to section 2.318 of the UCC. To
establish a privity requirement within the implied warranty of merchantability, as well as the more directly contractual express warranty and
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, section 2.318 could be
amended to provide:
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties of Quality and Need for Privity of Contract
No one other than a buyer may take advantage of an express or implied warranty of quality made to that buyer, and the buyer may not
sue a third party other than the immediate seller for breach of an
express or implied warranty. Notwithstanding this section, a seller
may contractually agree to extend an express warranty to persons
other than the immediate buyer.
This proposed legislative amendment would accomplish little if the
courts were left free to award damages to a nonprivity plaintiff for the
reduced value of a defective product under strict tort liability. Texas strict
tort liability law currently allows recovery of this reduced value when a
defective product also causes injury to person or property. 29' The Texas
legislature should therefore codify the common law of strict tort liability
by enacting a statutory equivalent to section 402A of the Restatement 292
and limiting recoverable damages to those for injury to person or property.
Legislatures in other states have already enacted versions of section 402A
that could serve as models for a Texas strict tort liability statute. 293 This
statutory form of strict tort liability would provide a measure of reliability
291. See supra text accompanying note 60.
292.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS §

402A (1965).

293. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-318.2, 85-2-318.3 (Supp. 1983) (coextensive with § 402A
except requires proximate cause; contained in UCC adjacent to implied warranty provisions); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A- I to -5 (Bums Supp. 1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 221 (1964) (coextensive with § 402A except only foreseeable users or consumers allowed a
recovery); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920 (1981) (duplicating § 402A with expressed legislative
intent that statute be construed in accordance with section 402A comments a-m); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-73-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (duplicating § 402A and incorporating comments as legislative intent). The Indiana, Maine, Oregon, and South Carolina strict liability
statutes are not contained in the UCC enactment of those states and do not express any
intent to limit the availability of a cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability. The Arkansas Legislature expressly stated that the strict liability action did
not limit actions in negligence or implied warranty. 1973 ARK. ACTS No. 11, § 3.
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to Texas products liability law and reduce wasteful litigation spawned by
the uncertainty of the scope of judicially adopted strict tort liability.
V.

CONCLUSION

Products liability law in Texas currently provides three major avenues to
recovery for injury caused by a product defect to a party not in privity of
contract with the merchant seller of the product. Concurrent litigation of
three separate causes of action for the same injury is difficult, costly, and
unnecessary to ensure a deserving plaintiff a remedy. Legislative action
building on the statutory framework of the UCC could simplify products
litigation by the enactment of a comprehensive statute defining the respective roles of the breach of implied warranty of merchantability and strict
liability in tort.
Limiting the cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of
merchantability to only those parties in privity of contract with a defendant seller of a defective product would simplify the litigation of products
liability claims by consumers against remote manufacturers. These nonprivity consumer lawsuits would not be encumbered by inappropriate disclaimer, limitation period, and notice provisions of the UCC that are best
suited to controversies between the parties to a contract of sale. The right
of a nonprivity plaintiff to a remedy for the injury to his person or property
would be fulfilled in the causes of action for negligence and strict tort
liability.
Statutory enactment of a form of strict tort liability would further ensure
that the distinctions between tort law and contract law are preserved.
Damages recoverable under a strict tort liability statute could be limited to
those for the traditional tortious injury to person or property. Recovery
for the loss of value of a defective product would be available only to
parties who are in privity with a seller and who have the opportunity to
bargain for a price consistent with a product's quality.
Legislative amendment of the UCC to require privity of contract in an
implied warranty of merchantability cause of action and a statutory enactment of strict tort liability limiting recovery to damages for physical injury
should alleviate the confusion engendered by multiple theory products liability litigation in Texas. These proposed changes generally comport with
existing Texas law, but eliminate alternate causes of action that are substantially duplicative. These proposals would simplify products liability
law while preserving for a party injured by a defective product the right to
a judicial remedy.

